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Abstract
Ostensibly, the Irish Constitution of 1937 draws philosophical inspiration from Catholic 
social teachings and the theory of natural law. While it enshrines rather generic concepts of 
democracy and popular sovereignty, it seems bereft of distinctively republican ideas, despite the 
republican influences of the Irish political revolution. However, this article argues that many 
of the central devices and institutions of the Constitution may be interpreted in a republican 
light.
Keywords: constitution, republicanism, sovereignty, rights.
Résumé
La Constitution irlandaise de 1937 s’inspire ostensiblement de l’enseignement social de l’Eglise 
catholique et de la théorie du droit naturel. Bien qu’elle consacre des principes généraux relative-
ment banals en termes de démocratie et de souveraineté populaire, elle ne semble pas avoir un carac-
tère typiquement républicain, malgré les inspirations républicaines de la révolution politique irlan-
daise. Toutefois, cet article affirme qu’un certain nombre de dispositifs institutionnels centraux de la 
Constitution peuvent être interprétés dans une perspective républicaine.
Mots clés : constitution, républicanisme, souveraineté, droits.
•  Introduction
The approaching centenary of the Irish state has, unsurprisingly, prompted 
a great deal of reflection as to its republican character and credentials, and parti-
cularly as to the legacy of the republican ideas and rhetoric that motivated much 
of the political revolution from which the independent polity emerged. Much of 
this analysis has focused on the political culture of the State, and particularly its 
alleged pathologies of clientelism and corruption. However, relatively little has been 
said about the republican character, or otherwise, of the Irish Constitution. On the 
one hand, the Constitution of 1937 was seemingly influenced by Catholic social 
thought and characterised by a bellicose Gaelic-Christian nationalism that seemed 
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rather bereft of republican potential. On the other hand, there are clear imprints 
of traditional republican ideas in constitutional provisions and principles relating to 
the structure and ethos of state institutions – some of which differentiated the new 
state from the parliamentary-centred model of the British constitution.
Accordingly, in this article I will consider to what extent republican ideas 
have influenced the Irish Constitution both in its historical and contemporary 
form. On the one hand, I will argue that the Constitution embraces many rather 
generic, non-specific republican ideas – like the rule of law, equality before the 
law and even the separation of church and state – that seem unremarkable with 
reference to the wider landscape of European liberal democracies. Equally, more 
distinctively “republican” concepts – such as civic participation and civic virtue – 
are either conspicuously absent or at least muted in the wider landscape of Irish 
constitutional thought. However, I will also argue that many of the central devices 
and institutions of the Irish Constitution may be interpreted in a specifically 
republican light.
I will make this argument with reference to two particular areas of constitutio-
nal doctrine: popular sovereignty and constitutional rights. I will argue that while 
the ideology of popular sovereignty seems to enshrine a plebiscitary concept of 
democracy that keeps the people at “arm’s length” in constituted governance, it 
can equally be understood as a means of checking executive dominance in the area 
of constitutional change, and ultimately as a safeguard against arbitrary gover-
nance. Similarly, while the acceptance of judicial supremacy in relation to consti-
tutional rights seems to stem from an American-influenced liberalism – one that 
has a depoliticizing and decidedly unrepublican character – equally rights can be 
interpreted not simply as a guarantee of non-interference for individuals against 
the state, but rather as safeguards to ensure the primacy of the common good in 
the context of legislative process. Thus, my argument neither assumes any authen-
tic, true version of the republican tradition, nor does it claim the Constitution 
itself has a singular or even a distinctive ideological or philosophical character. 
Rather the argument is a more modest one: it is that while the existing, amor-
phous precepts of constitutional doctrine have most often been understood in 
relation to liberal or communitarian ways of thinking, they are amenable to being 
reinterpreted in light of distinctively republican values.
In the first section, I will discuss the transposition of republican themes in dif-
ferent constitutional traditions, and give a brief assessment of their applications 
in the Irish context. In the second and third sections, I will consider how two of 
the central doctrines of the Irish Constitution – popular sovereignty and “natural” 
individual rights – may be reconceptualised in a distinctively republican sense.
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•  Republican constitutionalism: an overview
While the republican tradition is usually defined with reference to the ideals 
of civic virtue, participative self-government and freedom as non-domination, its 
specific forms and instantiations are diverse and its conceptual and philosophical 
parameters are deeply contested. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the repu-
blican tradition simply has no conceptual or philosophical unity across different 
historical and nationally specific instantiations1. Republicans have sometimes 
understood citizenship in a full-throated, ancient sense as the highest realisation 
of the good life, but also in a more instrumental sense as a means of protecting 
individual liberties and private property2. Republicanism has been associated with 
austere, martial social mores, but has equally taken root in liberal, commercial 
societies. Besides, it is not self-evident why republicanism should be considered 
an attractive framework for contemporary politics: historically, as Goodin points 
out, republican ideas have carried a price in terms of personal autonomy, cultural 
pluralism and even toleration3, while real-life republican societies have engendered 
various forms of “communitarian excess4”.
Correspondingly, republican idealism has received startlingly different consti-
tutional expressions. For example, while figures like Jean-Jacques Rousseau advo-
cated a “direct” model of participative democracy, republicans like James Madison 
argued for a highly mediated and representative form of politics, with both 
appealing to the overarching ideals of civic virtue and non-arbitrary government. 
Modern republicanism is associated with the unitary and indivisible state advo-
cated by Rousseau, but also the federalism or “checks and balances” expounded 
by Madison5. Similarly, both the model of parliamentary supremacy that defines 
British public law, and the contrasting vision of judicial supremacy that has pre-
vailed for two centuries in the United States, have been interpreted and defended 
in “republican” terms6. To an extent, this reflects reasonable disagreement concer-
ning how abstract ideals such as non-domination or non-arbitrary rule may be 
institutionally instantiated. However, it also simply reflects the extraordinary mal-
leability of the republican ideal in politics generally, and the fact that it is flexible 
1.  Robert Goodin, “Folie Républicaine”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol 6, no 1, June 2003.
2.  See generally Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism, London, Taylor & Francis, 2002.
3.  Ibid. Kautz also argues that republicanism breeds intolerance. See Steven Kautz, “he Liberal Idea of Tolera-
tion”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, no 2, May 1993.
4.  Goodin, “Folie Républicaine”. In Honohan’s terms, the classical version of republicanism has been decried as 
“inherently oppressive, moralistic, exclusive, militarist and masculinist’. Honohan, Civic Republicanism, p. 6.
5.  Honohan, Civic Republicanism, op. cit., Chapter II.
6.  See especially Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007; 




(or indeterminate) enough to have been invoked in support of opposing political 
visions, both populist and elitist, radical and conservative.
Nonetheless, certain common themes emerge in the historical and contem-
porary expressions of republican constitutionalism. On the one hand, republi-
can thinkers have historically understood freedom not as the absence of interfe-
rence or coercion as such, but rather as security against arbitrary power7. In Philip 
Pettit’s interpretation of the Roman and renaissance republican tradition, “the 
antonym of freedom [is] not interference but rather domination – exposure to 
the arbitrary, uncheckable power of a dominus or a master in one’s life8”. In turn, 
constitutional scholars like Bellamy and Tomkins have argued that this republican 
concept of freedom is given expression, at the political level, in the parliamen-
tary model of accountable government. Thus, political freedom, in its republican 
sense, is not realised through any definite set of individual rights, placed above 
and beyond politics – but rather through a political structure that enshrines the 
equal status of citizens who are deeply divided as to questions of “right”, as well 
as the good. In one strand of the republican constitutional tradition, then, there is 
strong resistance towards any attempt to juridify or depoliticise “rights”.
Ostensibly, the contrasting American model of constitutionalism, predi-
cated on judicial supremacy in relation to controversies around rights, appears 
more remote from historical republican thinking – simply because it seems to 
depoliticise rights, and privileges negative individual freedom as an overarching 
normative goal. That is, it seems to conceive of freedom simply as a constraint 
on government power, and of “rights” as being put beyond the ordinary fray of 
political contestation, in the sense that liberal philosophers like Dworkin and 
Rawls defend9. In this framework, citizenship and political participation are 
assigned a more modest and instrumental value. Yet this liberal model of consti-
tutionalism can equally claim the republican mantle. Judicially enforced consti-
tutional rights may be interpreted not simply as purely negative liberties or as 
barriers against state power, but rather as safeguards against arbitrary govern-
ment, and as checks on the predicates of state power rather than as objective 
moral rights per se10. Indeed, Pettit himself rejects the idea that republicanism 
should be constitutionally translated as a model of parliamentary supremacy: 
he embraces a version of “legal constitutionalism” in order to promote broad 
7.  See generally Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
8.  Philip Pettit, “he Tree of Liberty: Republicanism, American, French and Irish”, Field Day Review, vol. 1, no 1, 
2005, p. 30.
9.  John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1978.
10.  Richard Pildes, “Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism’ 
he Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 27, , no 2, June 1998.
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contestation and “checks and balances” as the best institutional expression of 
the Roman-republican ideal11.
These themes have found a relatively muted expression in the Irish consti-
tutional tradition. Of course, republicanism itself has, in Ireland, been strongly 
associated with extra-constitutionalist and violent versions of nationalism. Garvin 
has described Irish republicanism as “nationalist, separatist, vaguely socialist and 
sometimes Caesaro-papist12”. And with the campaign of the Provisional IRA in 
the context of the Northern Irish Troubles, republicanism in recent decades 
became associated with ethno-religious nationalism, in contrast with the older 
anti-sectarian thinking associated with the United Irish movement13. Indeed a 
pessimist might conclude that there is little scope for a vibrant republican culture 
in a policy where civic morality was historically divested to the religious domain 
– or more recently, identified with the demands of the market14. And indeed, 
for obvious reasons, constitutional debates in the early independent state tended 
equally to focus on the external dimensions of sovereignty rather than on domes-
tic political structures15. While the American constitutional tradition draws on 
Madison’s republicanism and its French counterpart more from Rousseau, there is 
no equivalent or distinctive inspiration in the Irish constitutional context.
However, Irish republican discourse has not been completely severed from 
wider republican thinking. While historical Irish-republican thought was more 
concerned with freedom from external domination than with internal constitutio-
nal arrangements, O’Callaghan has argued that its nationalist rhetoric was infused 
with and borrowed from the classical and the 18th-century republican traditions16. 
Indeed there are strong traces of republican thinking in nationalist rhetoric: the 
1919 Declaration of Independence affirmed: “The Irish people is resolved to 
secure and maintain its complete independence in order to promote the common 
weal17.” De Valera’s romantic vision of austerity and rural virtue might seem a 
departure from bona fide republican thought, yet in fact it echoes some of its his-
11.  Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: a Republican heory and Model of Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013.
12.  Tom Garvin, “An Irish republican tradition”, Iseult Honohan (ed.), Republicanism in Ireland: Confronting 
heories and Traditions, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2008, p. 23-30, p. 24.
13.  Kevin Whelan, “Republicanism: he Legacy of the United Irishmen”, in Robert Savage (ed.), Ireland in the 
New Century, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2003.
14.  See e.g. Fintan. O’Toole (ed.), Up the Republic! Towards a New Ireland, London, Faber and Faber, 2012.
15.  Admittedly, there were some attempts at democratic experimentation in the Irish Free State. See Laura Ca-
hillane, ‘Anti-Party Politics in the Irish Free State Constitution’, Dublin University Law Journal, vol. 35, no 1, 
May 2012, p. 34-71.
16.  Margaret O’Callaghan, “Reconsidering the Republican tradition in nineteenth-century Ireland”, in Honohan 
(ed.), Republicanism in Ireland, op. cit., p. 31-44.
17.  Dáil Éireann Debates, op. cit., Volume 1, 21 January 1919.
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torical strands: Rousseau, indeed, celebrated peasant autarky as a social framework 
for republican virtue18.
Furthermore, while the “republican” identity of the State was muted in the 
context of the Northern Ireland conflict, the concept has arguably been rehabili-
tated or “reclaimed” in recent years19. Increasingly, the idea is invoked not only in 
the narrow terms of sovereignty and national self-government, but also in relation 
to broader themes of citizenship across social and economic life. In the discourses 
of President Michael D. Higgins as well as other public figures, the idea of the 
Republic has, for example, been invoked against clerical interference in politics, 
political corruption, and socio-economic inequalities20. And to an extent at least, 
these republican themes of civic virtue and the common good seemed to have 
particular resonance during a social and economic crisis that stemmed from the 
deregulatory excesses and governmental failures of the Celtic Tiger era21. Many of 
the major political parties have laid claim to the republican mantle, to the extent 
that, far from representing a violent fringe, the phrase risks becoming empty and 
banal. Indeed, perhaps it can be argued that “republican” thinking, in Ireland as 
elsewhere, lacks specificity and has become a synonym for all that is wholesome in 
politics.
Nonetheless, this revived interest in republican thinking invites a reapprai-
sal of the republican influences in the historical and contemporary forms of 
Irish constitutionalism. Ostensibly at least, the Irish Constitution does not seem 
to draw its inspiration from distinctively republican thought; rather it appeals 
both to “natural” rights – this being partly a product of religious influence – as 
well as appealing to a national identity that is defined in Gaelic and Christian, 
rather than purely civic terms, as seems evident in the preamble in particular, 
with its invocation of “our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ”, as well as the “centuries 
of trial” attributed to ancestral heroes22. While it gives a central position to ideals 
of popular sovereignty and democracy, these are quite generic and non-specific 
concepts that are not especially associated with republican thought, and indeed 
which may seem quite hollow when considered in light of the practical realities 
of the State to which the Constitution refers. Similarly, a concept of rights as 
“natural” rather than distinctively civic or political constructs – that is, as being 
above or beyond politics – seems inconsistent with republican thinking on the 
subject of individual rights. However, in the following sections I will argue that 
while distinctively republican ideas are not particularly prominent in the constitu-
18.  See e.g. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Projet de Constitution pour la Corse, Paris, Nautilus, 2000.
19.  See e.g. Honohan, Republicanism in Ireland, op. cit.
20.  See in particular Michael D. Higgins, Renewing the Republic, Dublin, Liberties Press, 2012.
21.  See generally O’Toole, Up the Republic!, op. cit.
22.  See preamble, Constitution of 1937.
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tional text, and while the Constitution has not been interpreted or instantiated in 
a particularly “republican” way, the central devices and institutions of the Consti-
tution can nonetheless be re-conceptualised in a distinctively republican light.
•  Popular sovereignty
Popular sovereignty has been understood as the definitive and overarching 
principle of the Irish constitutional order. Article 6 proclaims that all “powers 
of Government” are derived – albeit “under God” – from “the people”. In more 
practical terms, the idea of popular sovereignty served as a legitimating principle 
for the enactment of the Constitution in the post-independence context as well 
as something approximating a constitutional doctrine that differentiated the new 
state from the British constitutional tradition.
To an extent, the principle of popular sovereignty served as the philosophical 
foundation stone of the Constitution, which differentiated it from the parliamen-
tary-focused British tradition. The emphasis on popular sovereignty in both 1922 
and 1937 Constitutions “represented a decisive break with the British constitutio-
nal tradition, which viewed sovereign authority as vested in the political organs of 
the State rather than in the people as such23”. O’Cinneide notes an early “desire to 
give substantive effect to the idea of popular sovereignty [which] led the drafters 
of both constitutions to experiment with different methods of ensuring greater 
popular participation24”. While the 1922 Constitution was viewed by republicans 
as offering a limited and compromised form of national sovereignty, the enact-
ment of a new Constitution through a national plebiscite partly served to put 
beyond doubt that the State derived from the constituent Irish “people” rather 
than the consent or acquiescence of the Westminster Parliament. Popular soverei-
gnty both legitimated and defined the new Constitution, with de Valera asserting 
in the Dáil debates that the new charter made the people the “masters25”.
The invocation of popular sovereignty also reflected the contemporary real-
politik. It proved politically expedient in the peculiar historical circumstances in 
which the current Constitution of 1937 emerged: the enactment of the Bunreacht 
broke the chain of legal continuity with the Irish Free State Constitution and the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty, which made no provision for the possibility of a new consti-
tution being enacted. And so de Valera appealed directly to the “people” as an 
ultimate and overriding source of legitimacy for the new Constitution26. The 
23.  Colm O’Cinneide “he People are the Masters: the Paradox of Constitutionalism and the Uncertain Status 
of Popular Sovereignty within the Irish Constitutional Order”, Irish Jurist, vol. 48, no 1, May 2012, p. 251.
24.  O’Cinneide, “he People are the Masters”, op. cit., p. 273.
25.  See Dáil Éireann debates, Volume 67, op. cit., Col 74-76, 11 May 1937.
26.  “he people… can efect this revolution”. See ibid.
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plebiscite of 1937 – a constituent moment – allowed the authority of the new 
Constitution to be grounded in new, extra-legal source – the consent and affirma-
tion of the voting “people”. De Valera understood the plebiscite as a mechanism 
through which the people could re-assert its original sovereignty and thereby over-
ride the legal constraints of the constituted order. He appealed to the authority of 
“the sovereign people who are above the lawyers and above the Government and 
all others”. The new constitution, he said, would be “the foundation law of the 
sovereign people of this country27”.
Therefore, from the outset, popular sovereignty was associated with the expres-
sion of the popular voice in referendum exercises. One of the distinctive, and 
unusual, features of the Constitution was the fact that it could only be amended 
through a referendum process. In turn, this has been understood as the primary, if 
not the exclusive mechanism for giving expression to popular sovereignty.
The understanding of the Irish people as “sovereign” oscillates between enshri-
ning a purely symbolic status for the people as the constituent power and the 
nominal source of political authority, and actually according the people a direct 
role in the governance of the state. Indeed the concept of “sovereignty” is used 
in ambiguous and sometimes contradictory ways in legal and political theory. 
In some instances it refers to the supreme governing agent within a polity, as 
in Hobbes’ or Austin’s account – as the uncommanded commander28. But in 
contemporary democratic societies, it is typically used to designate the “people” 
not as an active governing agent, but rather as the source of governmental autho-
rity in a more formal and symbolic sense, or as an authorising agent rather than 
an actively governing one29.
In the Irish constitutional case law, the principle has been invoked almost 
exclusively in relation to the people’s role in the constitutional-amendment 
process. On the one hand, the device of the constitutional referendum is com-
monly taken as a hallmark and expression of popular sovereignty. On the other, 
popular sovereignty has been interpreted, in practical terms, as meaning that the 
people’s right of constitutional amendment is substantively unfettered. Unusually 
in European terms, this means that no constitutional principle is unamendable or 
immutable30. Indeed the concept of popular sovereignty has almost been confla-
ted with the referendum mechanism. The Supreme Court, for example, noted, 
27.  Ibid.
28.  homas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, 
ed. by Ian Shapiro, Yale, Yale University Press, 2010; John Austin, he Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 
London, John Murray, 1832.
29.  For this distinction see Peter Steinberger, “Hobbes, Rousseau and the Modern Conception of the State”, he 
Journal of Politics, 70: 595, 2008.
30.  As Casey notes, “other western European constitutions characteristically declare one or more matters im-
mutable.” James Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 709.
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“the Constitution… was enacted by the people and… can be amended by the 
people only [as] the sovereign authority31”. Popular sovereignty has consistently 
been invoked to reject various challenges to constitutional amendments that were 
alleged to have violated supposedly immutable or essential constitutional prin-
ciples, particularly the principles of natural law32”. Thus the Supreme Court has 
rejected the argument that even “natural” human rights in the Constitution are 
immutable or unamendable, reasoning that “the people intended to give them-
selves full power to amend any provision of the Constitution33”. Thus “a propo-
sal to amend the Constitution cannot per se be unconstitutional34”. Similarly it 
has been said “there can be no question of a constitutional amendment properly 
before the people and approved by them being itself unconstitutional35”. And this 
view of referendums as expressions of sovereignty has been reflected, to an extent, 
in wider constitutional theory as well as in jurisprudence: Tierney, for example, 
suggests that constitutional referendums potentially represent “true conduits of 
popular determination36”.
However, this has led to certain conceptual tensions in relation to the subs-
tance and scope of popular sovereignty. Unusually, the normative identity of the 
Irish Constitution has not been associated with any of its substantive principles, 
but rather its method of adoption and amendment. Relatedly, popular soverei-
gnty itself is understood simply in procedural rather than substantive terms. It 
has not been identified with any specific rights or principles – for example, the 
rights citizens might need to meaningfully participate in government. Rather, 
it has been understood reductively in relation to the people’s formal role in the 
constituent process. Put simply, popular sovereignty translates to a procedure for 
determining constitutional content, and not to any definite content. If popular 
sovereignty is understood in purely procedural terms, this is potentially self-
contradicting if the substance or content of popular rule is undermined through 
the constitutional-amendment process. Thus the procedural aspect of popular 
sovereignty is arguably self-limiting. Arguably it could not, for example, logically 
be used to remove or undermine the preconditions for the exercise of popular 
sovereignty itself – particularly the rights of expression, association and suffrage 
which are needed to participate in the political process. Philip Pettit, for example, 
argues that rights relating to democratic contestation must be placed beyond the 
31.  Byrne v Ireland [1972] IR 241, 262, emphasis added.
32.  Finn v Att. Gen [1983] IR 154; Riordan v An Taoiseach (No.1), [1999] 4 IR 321.
33.  Finn v Att. Gen [1983] IR 154, 163, emphasis added.
34.  Slattery v An Taoiseach [1993] 1 IR 286.
35.  Riordan v An Taoiseach (No.1), [1999] 4 IR 321, 330.
36.  Stephen Tierney, “Constitutional referendums: a theoretical inquiry”, Modern Law Review, vol. 72, no 3, 
 September 2009, p. 364, emphasis added.
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constitutional amendment process.37 The Constitution, he argues, must “put 
various issues off the popular agenda38”.
As discussed, the Supreme Court has affirmed that: “the Constitution… 
is the fundamental and supreme law of the State representing… the will of the 
People39”. Correspondingly it has been assumed that interpreting the Constitu-
tion is essentially an exercise in retrieving the will of the people as expressed in the 
referendum process40. In Tierney’s terms, this is the view that the constitutional 
referendum allows the people to “‘produce’ sovereign decisions41”, such that ulti-
mately the Constitution embodies “the settled will of a democratic people42”.
However, this overstates the degree of agency the people enjoys in the context 
of the constitutional-amendment process. Somewhat ambitiously, it presumes 
both that the referendum is capable of crystallising a collective “will” – on the 
part of a unitary corporate entity called “the people” – and in turn that the consti-
tutional text can effectuate this will. The idea that the constitutional referendum 
inscribes the popular will in the basic law of the state not only makes dubious 
assumptions concerning group agency and the possibility of collective will43 – 
more simply, it ignores the various ways in which popular agency is checked and 
contained by various elite-driven processes. Of course, constitutional referendums 
cannot be initiated spontaneously by the “people” themselves, not least because 
the initiative mechanism is reserved formally speaking to the Oireachtas, and in 
effect, to the Government. Thus while constitutional jurisprudence often speaks 
as if the people enjoyed an unconditioned, freestanding power of amendment, in 
effect they only enjoy a veto power in a multi-stage constitutional-amendment 
process. The people’s agency is constrained by various intermediary institutions44”.
Thus, the people’s power is far more modest than what constitutional mytho-
logy suggests. In political-theory terms, the constitutional referendum mechanism 
affords the people (limited) influence, but not control of the kind that “soverei-
gnty” implies. Being couched within a limiting initiative procedure, the people 
can never be seen as engaged in a freestanding act of creation or control. In 
the context of the amendment process, the people are very much a constituted, 
37.  See Pettit, On the People’s Terms, op. cit., Chapter 4. Pettit suggests: “his is not to put a brake on democracy 
but to ensure people have truly equal access to democratic inluence”; p. 207.
38.  Ibid.
39.  Re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Bill 
1995 [1995] 1 IR 1.
40.  In Sullivan v Robinson, Justice O’Byrne suggested “a Constitution is to be liberally construed so as to carry into 
efect the intentions of the people embodied therein.” [1954] IR 161, 174. 
41.  Tierney, “Constitutional referendums: a theoretical inquiry”, p. 363.
42.  Ibid., p. 366.
43.  See generally Jane Schacter, “he Pursuit of ‘Popular Intent’: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy”, 
Yale Law Journal, vol. 105, no 1, 1995. Also see Honohan, Civic Republicanism, p. 220, emphasis added.
44.  See Eoin Daly, “A republican defence of the constitutional referendum”, Legal Studies, vol. 35, no 1, 2015.
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rather than a constituent authority, as part of an interaction of different mutually 
constraining assemblies and authorities and with a procedurally couched role.
Moreover, there has been little sustained effort to relate this foundational 
political principle of the Constitution to more substantive themes of citizenship 
and civic participation. As O’Cinneide has argued, de Valera’s assertion that the 
Constitution made the people the “masters” rings hollow given that, for most 
practical purposes, the “people” are kept “at arm’s length” in the constituted gover-
nance of the State45. Indeed the State established a marked contradiction between 
an emphatic official emphasis on popular sovereignty as a definitive constitutional 
doctrine, and the marginalisation of the abstract, sacralised “people” in the actual 
business of government46”. Tentative democratic experimentation – such as the 
popular initiative procedure originally envisaged in the Constitution of 1922 – 
waned in the fraught political environment of the 1920s and 1930s47”.
Thus it has been commonplace for constitutional theory and jurisprudence to 
invoke “the people” as the formal source of constitutional authority almost as an 
empty formula – as a purely abstract proposition that fails to consider citizen-
ship in concrete, participative terms. It has been argued that popular sovereignty 
occupies a “quasi–religious” position in constitutional jurisprudence48 – that 
it is “venerated in constitutional theology49”. But this simply is not reflected in 
the realities of the independent state, and, in particular, the “sharp disconnect 
in Ireland between the people and the systems of governance by which they are 
ruled50”.
Nonetheless, the plebiscitary characteristics of the Irish Constitution, and the 
accompanying rhetoric of popular sovereignty, can be re-interpreted in distinctly 
republican terms.
Of course, the idea that constitutional referendums give the sovereign people 
“direct control51” over constitutional content is simply unrealistic, for the reasons 
outlined. Indeed, republicans have historically been sceptical towards “direct” 
or purely majoritarian democracy, fearing the spectre of majority domination or 
tyranny. For Pettit, it risks engendering “the ultimate form of arbitrariness, the 
tyranny of a majority52”. James Madison described “pure” democracy as “incom-
patible with personal security or the rights of property53”. Instead republicans 
45.  Colm O’Cinneide, “he People are the Masters”, p. 256.
46.  Ibid.
47.  Ibid., p. 274.
48.  Gary Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2010.
49.  O’Cinneide, “he People are the Masters”, art. cit., p. 256.
50.  Ibid., p. 252.
51.  Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: he heory and Practice of Republican Deliberation, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2012, p. 13, 15.
52.  Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A heory of Freedom and Government, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 8.
53.  James Madison, Federalist no. 10, New York, Clinton Rossiter, 1961, p. 81.
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have advocated a model of “‘checks and balances’ or mutually constraining assem-
blies54”. From most republican perspectives, “direct” democratic mechanisms 
undermine the moderating virtues associated with parliamentary democracy. 
Indeed, Pettit, for example, contrasts the neo-Roman tradition with Rousseau’s 
“communitarian” conception of political freedom, which, he argues, requires 
citizens to deliberate upon and directly legislate the “general will, the corporate 
will of the political community55”. Thus, republicans are likely to be apprehensive 
of constitutional referendums, where they are presented as exercises in popular 
sovereignty that override and sidestep the equilibrium of constituted authorities 
and assemblies. They will fear that direct-democracy exercises undermine the 
moderating and deliberative virtues of political representation, exalting “brute 
preference” above “the good of the group56”. Indeed, Pettit apprehensively des-
cribes “a plebiscitarian dispensation in which each participant privately forms his 
or her judgment about common avowable interests, rather than doing so in dia-
logue with others57”.
However, I argued in the previous section that the constitutional referendum 
cannot coherently be understood as a pure or unbridled expression of popular 
will. By the same light, its republican potential becomes apparent. For the same 
reasons that referendums cannot project an uncompounded popular will, equally 
they cannot be understood as a vehicle of populist tyranny. And while popular 
power is itself mediated and checked through various procedural mechanisms, the 
referendum mechanism itself serves, in turn, to check the power of other poli-
tical organs in the domain of constitutional change. For contemporary republi-
can theorists, state power is non-arbitrary, and therefore consistent with political 
freedom, to the extent that it is subject to suitable mechanisms of popular contes-
tation and control58”. The “mixed” constitution will contain or at least mini-
mise arbitrary power by providing suitable avenues of contestation. In turn, the 
constitutional referendum that has so strongly defined Irish constitutional culture 
can be understood in this light – not as an authorial mechanism through which 
the people directly exercise constituent power or even “sovereignty”, but rather a 
contestatory mechanism through which representative and executive organs are 
controlled and held to account59”.
54.  Ibid.
55.  Pettit, On the People’s Terms, op. cit., p. 4-5.
56.  Philip Pettit, “Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma and Republican heory”, James Fishkin and 
Peter Laslett (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, vol. 7, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 138-
162, p. 140.
57.  Ibid.
58.  Pettit, On the People’s Terms, op. cit.
59.  Ibid., Chapter 4.
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Pettit argues that a “plenary” legislative body is too unwieldy and uncons-
trained to offer an appropriate mechanism of republican government. However, 
the lack of constraint post-decision is counterbalanced somewhat by the procedu-
ral safeguards that operate at the initiation stage – a “plenary” legislature of the 
people does not offer the open-ended subject-matter discretion that conventio-
nal assemblies enjoy. Since the power of initiative is confined to the legislature, 
this ensures at least a certain degree of contestation and moderation of the refe-
rendum proposal itself. More importantly, while the referendum is itself highly 
constrained, it serves, in turn, to constrain executive and parliamentary power in 
the domain of constitutional change. In Ireland, this is especially valuable in a 
context of particularly strong executive dominance. While the constitutional refe-
rendum hardly allows the people to originate or author constitutional content, 
for the reasons outlined, at least it offers a check on the ability of the executive to 
effectuate constitutional change via the legislative process. And in systems cha-
racterised by strong executive dominance over parliament, this assumes critical 
importance. Under the Irish Free State Constitution (1922-1937), the possibility 
of amending the constitution via ordinary legislation, rather than referendum, 
effectively gave the Executive Council a free hand in diluting various constitu-
tional safeguards – for example, removing the provision for popular-initiative 
referendum, and allowing extensive powers for military tribunals60. By way of 
contrast, the requirement of a constitutional-amendment referendum under the 
new Constitution of 1937 provided some measure of restraint on the govern-
ment, despite providing a limited degree of popular empowerment. It helped to 
ensure a certain degree of constitutional stability compared to the 1922 Consti-
tution, as well as a safeguard against constitutional revisions designed to benefit 
sitting governments. For example, voters twice rejected attempts to remove the 
constitutional requirement of PR-STV (proportional representation) for Dáil 
elections, where this would have benefited the governing Fianna Fáil party61. And 
in addition to the defeated amendments, the referendum requirement has cer-
tainly deterred various reforms that Governments would otherwise have pursued 
through the parliamentary route62. Thus although “direct democracy” is often 
associated with unhinged populism, the constitutional referendum may play an 
essentially conservative role in entrenching constitutional content. Moreover, it 
has counterbalanced a general historical tendency that has seen increasing power 
60.  See Donal Cofey, “Judicial Review in the Irish Free State”, Dublin University Law Journal, vol. 33, no 1, May 
2011.
61.  hird Amendment of the Constitution Bill 1958; hird Amendment of the Constitution Bill 1968. See also 
Bill Kissane, “Is the Irish referendum majoritarian?”, in Wilfried Marxer (ed.), Direct Democracy and Minori-
ties, London, Springer, 2012, p. 152.
62.  In the Irish Free State, ordinary Acts inconsistent with the Constitution were simply accepted by the Courts as 
amendments to it. See State (Ryan) v Lennon [1935] IR 170. 
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accrue to the executive. While failing to provide large-scale popular empower-
ment, it has facilitated “the diffusion of power across institutions”,63 thus echoing 
traditional republican themes.
Of course, constitutional content might be entrenched and stabilised by alter-
native amendment mechanisms – for example, a parliamentary supermajority – 
but referendums demand a wider, and more public process of contestation and 
deliberation, in contrast to the party-political bargaining that might secure an 
enhanced legislative majority. Public justifications will be more widely exchanged. 
The vast majority of constitutional amendments in Ireland have been suppor-
ted by a cross-party consensus64. But correspondingly, each of these amendments 
would have mustered a parliamentary super-majority with little public debate.
Relatedly, while the constitutional referendum cannot be understood as giving 
“direct and unmediated expression […] to the popular will65”, instead it can be 
valued as a mechanism for promoting popular participation in government. The 
Irish Constitution has typically been understood as somehow giving voice to an 
elusive, ephemeral concept of the popular “will” – as implausible as this seems 
– yet it has rarely been understood as a framework for facilitating participatory 
and deliberative citizenship, as providing mechanisms through which citizens can 
participate in the definition of common interests. Yet when re-interpreted in this 
light, its republican potential becomes more apparent. Of course, compared to 
traditional republican practices, referendums are relatively undemanding in terms 
of the scale of civic involvement they demand of citizens (by the same measure 
they are relatively unintrusive, compared to say, military service.) It may entail 
relatively superficial, passive engagement. Yet a republican emphasis on partici-
patory constitutional mechanisms may serve as a corrective to the kinds of civic 
disengagement that may occur in a purely parliamentary system. There is empi-
rical evidence that referendums promote wider participation in politics66. Indeed 
compared to elections, they are more likely to prompt reflection on discrete poli-
tical issues. Thus, the shift in constitutional discourse witnessed in post-inde-
pendence Ireland – that is, a shift in emphasis from parliamentary to popular 
sovereignty – can be interpreted in a distinctly republican light.
63.  Kissane, “Is the Irish referendum majoritarian?”, p. 153. 
64.  Richard Sinnott, “Cleavages, parties and referendums: Relationships between representative and direct democ-
racy in the Republic of Ireland”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 41, no 6, October 2003, p. 815. 
65.  O’Cinneide, “he People are the Masters”, p. 260.
66.  Smith argued before the House of Lords Select Committee: “by ofering the opportunity to participate directly 
in policy-making, [referendums] made the public more likely to participate in political activity, “as they un-
derstand that their participation in the electoral process has real policy implications”; “12th Report”, p. 141. 
See Daniel Smith and Caroline Tolbert, Educated by Initiative: he Efects of Direct Democracy on Citizens and 
Political Organizations in the American States, Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2004.
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While many republicans view direct democracy apprehensively, as a source of 
potential tyranny or domination, I have argued that the constitutional referen-
dum does not in fact constitute “direct democracy” in a meaningful sense. An 
alternative understanding of the constitutional referendum – assigning the people 
a contestatory rather than an authorial or constituent role – reconciles it with the 
historical republican concern for “mixed” government.
•  Constitutional rights and non-domination
Many liberal thinkers have understood constitutions as mediating a tension 
between individual liberal rights, understood as negative rights of non-interfe-
rence, on the one hand and the democratic value of majority rule on the other. 
However, republican thinking often rejects or bypasses this kind of conceptual 
dichotomy. On the one hand, republicans will tend to emphasise the ideal of non-
arbitrary government, based on the common good (however defined), rather than 
the value of majority rule as such: indeed republican thinkers like Madison were 
notoriously hostile to unbridled or unmediated democracy. Republican thinkers 
might well (but not necessarily) defend a principle of democracy, not because it 
enshrines majoritarian will as such, but rather because they believe it promotes 
either civic virtue or non-domination67. Similarly, republicans will typically reject 
any understanding of individual rights as being purely negative in nature, or as 
being above and beyond politics. Rather, rights are a part of the “circumstances of 
politics”, and rather than being intrinsically in tension with democratic govern-
ment, they are constituted and maintained by political activity and by citizen-
ship itself. Thus in the United States, republicans have “challenge[d] a prevailing 
understanding of the constitution as primarily a set of rules to limit power… and 
protect individual rights”, re-interpreting it instead “as a framework for collective 
self-government based… on deliberation on common goods68”. It has been argued 
that discourses of “rights” and of human rights in particular, tend to “depoliti-
cise” questions of right, suggesting that rights offer a “boundary around the indi-
vidual […] defined against the state69”, and ignoring the political dimensions of 
freedom.
Relatedly, republicans generally reject any understanding of freedom as an 
absence of external restraint on individual choices or actions. Freedom, in the 
republican sense, does not consist of an absence of interference as such, but rather 
an absence of domination, where domination is the condition of being subject to 
67.  Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism.
68.  Honohan, Civic Republicanism, p. 7.




alien will. We can be dominated, Pettit suggests, without ever suffering interfe-
rence, and conversely, we can suffer interference that is not the manifestation of 
alien will – and which therefore is not abrogative of freedom at all70. Freedom, 
indeed, has no meaning pre-politically – it can only be realised in a framework 
of coercive laws. In Rousseau’s interpretation of the social contract tradition, we 
enter into political society not to preserve natural rights that pre-existed political 
society – but rather to free ourselves of dependency on alien will, which in turn is 
irreducible to any guaranteed spheres of non-interference for unhindered private 
actions71.
Against this backdrop, Irish constitutional culture seems to be informed by a 
theory of rights that is decidedly un-republican. While political freedom has been 
defined in relation to a concept of popular sovereignty as discussed above, indivi-
dual rights have been defined primarily with reference to a philosophy of natural 
law. This is partly a product of the Catholic-dominated intellectual climate in 
which the Constitution originated72. This drew, broadly speaking, on Aquinas’ 
understanding of natural law as that part of God’s eternal law that is accessible 
to humans through reason73. Clarke describes this as a “hybrid scholastic theory, 
partly derived from Aquinas and partly inherited from later scholastics through 
the intermediary of early twentieth-century Roman Catholic theology74”. This 
theory is particularly evident in the provisions concerning the rights of the family, 
marriage and property. In the constitutional text itself, rights are described as 
“natural”, “inalienable”, “imprescriptible”, or “antecedent to positive law75”. This 
philosophy of rights has been further expounded in landmark constitutional judg-
ments. In McGee v Attorney General, Justice Walsh observed:
Articles 41, 42, and 43 emphatically reject the theory that there are 
no rights without laws, no rights contrary to the law and no rights ante-
rior to the law. hey indicate that justice is placed above the law and 
acknowledge that natural rights or human rights are not created by law 
but that the Constitution conirms their existence and gives them protec-
tion. he individual has natural and human rights over which the State 
has no authority76.
70.  Pettit, Republicanism, Chapter 2.
71.  Jean-Jacques. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Paris, ENAG, 1988.
72.  Dermot Keogh and Andrew McCarthy, he Making of the 1937 Constitution, Cork, Mercier, 2007.
73.  See generally John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
74.  Desmond Clarke, “he Role of Natural Law in Irish Constitutional Law”, Irish Jurist, vol. 17, no 1, March 
1982, p. 193. 
75.  See articles 41.1.1, 42.1, 42A.1, 42A.2.1, 43.1.
76.  McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284, 310.
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Thus, natural-law discourse has drawn from secular theories of natural rights 
as well as the Christian influenced concept that historically predominated. This 
is particularly evident in the assertion in Article 43.1 that man enjoys the right 
to property “in virtue of his rational being”. This echoes the secular natural-law 
tradition, influenced especially by the 17th-century philosopher John Locke, who 
argued that governmental authority depends on respect for natural rights that 
exist before the coming into being of political society77.
Justice Walsh suggested that natural rights were not merely “an acknowledg-
ment of the ethical content of law in its ideal of justice78”, but rather, in essence, 
an integral component of the Constitution and an actionable source of consti-
tutional law. In a bold assertion of judicial power, he went as far as to suggest 
that it fell to judges, in light of their experience, to determine what such “natural 
rights” consist of – to “determine, where necessary, the rights which are superior 
or antecedent to positive law79”.
However, partly because the content of natural law is notoriously ambiguous80, 
natural-law thinking has done little to settle concrete questions concerning consti-
tutional rights in Ireland. Kavanagh argues that in Ireland, “natural law” simply 
became a by-word for the idea that judges should strike down those elements of 
the “positive law” (usually equated with legislation) that contradict an ethical idea 
of justice. Indeed it does not readily translate to an analytical theory of constitu-
tional rights. Natural law has most often been used to identify “un-enumerated” 
(implied) constitutional rights – rights such as privacy – which are derived from 
the overall spirit and ethos of the Constitution. Indeed other, equally vague philo-
sophical concepts such as the “human personality” and the “Christian and demo-
cratic nature of the state” have also been invoked81. Yet apart from a few cases, 
natural law has not generally been used to elaborate on the substance of consti-
tutional rights; “judges did not consult the great philosophical texts on natural 
law, apart from making occasional passing reference to their authors82.” Indeed, in 
some cases, natural-law concepts were used not to identify but to limit constitu-
tional rights – for example, in the 1983 Norris case concerning the criminal prohi-
bition of homosexuality83.
More broadly, since the 1960s there has been increasing reluctance to use 
explicitly religious sources for identifying un-enumerated rights – and the citation 
77.  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, Yale, Yale University Press, 2003.
78.  McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284, 317.
79.  [1974] IR 284, 318.
80.  John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
81.  Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294; Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36.
82.  Aileen Kavanagh, “Natural Law, Christian Values and the Ideal of Justice”, Irish Jurist, vol. 48, no 1, 2012, 
p. 80.
83.  [1984] IR 36.
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of papal encyclicals in constitutional-rights cases never survived the processes of 
secularisation that took root from the 1970s84. Indeed in the 1972 McGee case, 
which legalised contraception, Justice Walsh said that constitutional concepts 
of natural rights were “conditioned by the passage of time85”. More generally, in 
recent decades there has been growing reluctance to invoke natural-law ideas as 
a basis for constitutional rights, and a trend towards using more conventionally 
“legal” sources86. Clearly, this trend is inseparable from the broader secularisation 
of Irish politics and society; however, by the same measure it is unclear what the 
philosophy of natural rights in the Irish constitution now entails. The Constitu-
tion references various secular philosophical concepts – such as the “freedom and 
dignity” of the individual – but with the decline of natural-law thinking, there 
is no clear alternative philosophy of constitutional rights. In any event, it seems 
apparent that rights are still conceptualised not as instruments of the common 
good or of non-domination, whether social, economic or political – but rather as 
negative rights that are moral in character and that are defined and understood as 
being beyond or outside politics, contrary to the dominant republican understan-
ding.
Since freedom, in the republican tradition, consists of non-domination in the 
sense of non-arbitrary rule – and since domination is based on asymmetric power 
relationships rather than interference per se – it is arguable, in one sense, that 
judicially enforced constitutional rights are alien to the republican way of thin-
king about freedom and rights.
On the one hand, constitutional rights might be thought relatively ineffective 
in capturing the distributive dimension of freedom understood as non-domina-
tion. Freedom, in the republican sense, can be undermined simply by virtue of 
disparities of power and resources that force some to remain dependent on the 
goodwill of others. Since non-domination depends on people’s “relative powers” 
– and in particular, the opportunities and resources they enjoy relative to others 
– it requires a strong commitment to social and distributive justice that pro-
bably cannot be captured or realised as a set of individual rights, whether codified 
constitutionally or otherwise87. Republicans will recognise that domination can be 
constituted by private as well as public power; thus, non-domination requires a 
much wider political and social project, and not merely safeguards for individuals 
against encroachments of state power.
Constitutional rights may not only be ineffective, but positively counterpro-
ductive in promoting freedom in the republican sense. Republican scholars like 
84.  [1965] IR 294.
85.  [1974] IR 284, 319.
86.  [2009] IESC 82.
87.  Pettit, On the People’s Terms, Chapter 2.
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Richard Bellamy have argued that so-called “legal constitutionalism” – the ent-
renchment of constitutional principles in legal form – can itself lead to a form 
of domination by enshrining unaccountable judicial power88. Again, this reflects 
a broader republican scepticism towards the idea that individual freedom is best 
secured through legal rights that purport to transcend the political and legisla-
tive process. Given the disagreement that exists in contemporary societies as to 
concepts of right, judicial review is an arbitrary method for defining rights, since 
it is largely immune from the usual channels of accountability and contestation 
that apply in the political sphere. Given that citizens reasonably disagree as to 
the scope and meaning of rights and as to the reconciliation of competing rights-
claims, judicially enforced constitutional rights represent a site of unaccountable 
political power. Many republicans have simply insisted that republican freedom, 
understood as non-arbitrary rule, lies simply in the political and legislative process 
through which competing concepts of “rights” are ordered and reconciled, rather 
than in any definite concept of rights that is put above and beyond political 
contestation. Any attempt to depoliticise rights, they suggest, is itself a form of 
political domination. Any attempt to hive off “rights” controversies from the poli-
tical and legislative process is not only ad hoc and historically specific, but also 
risks itself constituting a form of arbitrary rule.
However, it is possible to reconceptualise judicially enforced constitutio-
nal rights in a manner that is consistent with republican ways of thinking about 
freedom89. In particular, it is possible to understand constitutional rights not as 
barriers against state power for individuals, but rather as guarantees of non-arbi-
trary government. Indeed, the republican understanding of freedom as an absence 
of domination rather than interference – that is, as security against arbitrary 
power – is arguably echoed, albeit indirectly, in the analytical theory of consti-
tutional rights90. Arguably, constitutional-rights jurisprudence, whether in Ireland 
or elsewhere, does not prohibit interference in protected activities as such, but only 
arbitrary interference. Generally speaking, interference in protected activity – say, 
religious practice or political expression – is only impermissible if it is dispropor-
tionate to a legitimate public goal connected to the common good91. In turn, this 
is conducive to the historical republican ways of thinking about freedom and 
“rights”. Constitutional rights, in this lens, are not safeguards for individual inte-
rests per se, but rather controls on the predicates of public action.
88.  Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism.
89.  For a fuller version of this argument see Eoin Daly, “Freedom as Non-domination in the jurisprudence of 
constitutional rights”, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 28, no 2, July 2015, p. 289-316.
90.  Eoin Daly and Tom Hickey, he Political heory of the Irish Constitution, Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 2015, Chapter 2.
91.  Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593; Cox v Ireland 14 [1992] 2 IR 503.
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For example, articles 8-11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
in requiring that interferences in protected rights are “prescribed by law” (rather 
than based on administrative discretion), arguably echo a republican concern to 
prevent arbitrary interference, rather than a “liberal” concern to prevent interfe-
rence per se. Similarly, the Irish Constitution references similar formulae such as 
“public order and morality” (Article 44) or “the exigencies of the common good” 
(Article 43), while constitutional jurisprudence has embraced a proportionality 
doctrine that developed originally in Canadian and German law92. In other ins-
tances, constitutional doctrine may account for the republican insight as to those 
forms of domination that occur without any interference per se ever being suffe-
red, simply by virtue of unchecked power disparities that pertain in public and 
private spheres93. Republicans, to generalise, have understood that citizens may 
suffer domination where they must live in apprehension of interferences that may 
occur – even improbably – with a change of circumstance or fortune that renders 
them vulnerable to the discretion or goodwill of others. While constitutional 
rights cannot account for the various kinds of power disparities that affect indi-
viduals in different social and economic spheres, they can account for the fear or 
apprehension of interference – the essence of domination – as well as interference 
that is actually suffered. For example, the Irish Supreme Court has given standing 
(locus standi) to individuals to challenge laws as unconstitutional, even where they 
have not suffered actual interference, or where interference is unlikely to occur94. 
The Court has recognised that “the [constitutional] provisions must enable the 
person invoking them not merely to redress a wrong resulting from an infringe-
ment of the guarantees but also to prevent the threatened or impending infringement 
of the guarantees95”… This is attributable in part to an implicit recognition that 
constitutional rights may be undermined by the state of uncertainty or fear as to 
the possibility of future interference in some protected conduct as much as by 
the actual experience of such interference. Furthermore, it supports the idea that 
constitutional rights may be understood less as safeguards for unhindered actions 
for individuals, and more as controls against arbitrary governmental power more 
generally96.
Similarly, constitutional judgments have recognised that violations of rights 
may occur where criminal offences are defined too vaguely or imprecisely – thus 
echoing an historical republican concern as to arbitrary power97. More generally, 
92.  Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593; Cox v Ireland 14 [1992] 2 IR 503.
93.  Daly, “Freedom as non-domination in the jurisprudence of constitutional rights”.
94.  Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36.
95.  King v Attorney General [1970] IR 317, 338, emphasis added.
96.  See generally Pildes, “Why Rights Are Not Trumps”, op. cit.
97.  King v Attorney General [1981] IR 233.
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Irish constitutional doctrine has reflected a concern not merely to protect certain 
zones of individual activity, but rather to check the means and process through 
which activities are hindered or restricted. It has been recognised, for example, 
that restrictions on constitutional rights must be grounded in legislation rather 
than official discretion98. This echoes provisions of the European Convention of 
Human Rights which provide that restrictions on the liberties of expression and 
of thought, conscience and belief must be exercised “in accordance with law99”. 
The concern is not to guarantee non-interference per se in relation to particular 
activities, but rather to protect against discretion, which is understood by repu-
blicans, historically, as the essence of arbitrary power100. And while some degree 
of discretion is inevitable in the modern administrative state, Irish constitutio-
nal doctrine has aimed to curtail its potentially arbitrary character in insisting, 
in particular, that officials vested with discretionary powers are obliged to give 
those affected by their decisions an opportunity to be heard and to put their 
case (audi alteram partem), to refrain from taking irrelevant considerations into 
account, to provide reasons for their decisions, and to avoid any perception of bias 
or partiality101. Again, more generally, these examples illustrate that the focus of 
constitutional doctrine is not necessarily “liberal”, as widely assumed, but at least 
potentially republican – because its concern is not to guarantee non-interference 
for individuals as such but rather to ensure the non-arbitrariness of governmental 
power.
•  Conclusion
The Irish Constitution has not traditionally been understood and discussed 
using a specifically republican discourse, of the kind that prevails in other constitu-
tional cultures such as that of France, or perhaps the United States. Instead, Irish 
constitutional culture has been informed either by rather generic, almost platitu-
dinous doctrines such as that of popular sovereignty – or an elusive notion of rule 
by the popular “will” – or, indeed, by distinctly un-republican concepts such as 
Christian values and natural law. While the democratic doctrine of the Constitu-
tion seems politically naïve, the philosophy of natural law has not meaningfully 
survived the processes of secularisation that Ireland has undergone since inde-
pendence. As a result, contemporary Irish constitutional culture lacks a definite 
98.  See DPP v Fagan [1994] 2 IR 265; Howard v Commisioners of Public Works [1994] 1 IR 101. Articulating a 
more general principle of legality, Justice Kearns stated: “every executive or administrative act which afects 
legal rights, interests or legitimate expectations must be legally justiied.” Browne v Attorney General [2002] 
IEHC 47.
99.  See Articles 8-10, European Convention on Human Rights.
100.  Timothy O’Neill, “Liberal Constitutionalism & Bureaucratic Discretion”, Polity, vol. 20, no 3, Spring 1988.
101.  McDonald v Bord na gCon [1965] IR 217.
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philosophical identity. I have not argued that historically, the 1937 Bunreacht can 
be understood as a quintessentially or authentically “republican” charter. However, 
I have argued that despite the absence of a republican discourse in Irish constitu-
tional culture, its existing devices and institutions can be reconceptualised in a 
republican light, or at least in a manner that is consistent with republican ways of 
thinking about political freedom and individual rights. In turn, the Constitution 
provides a fruitful avenue for republican thinking in the context of a revived inte-
rest in civic-republican thought in contemporary Ireland.
